‘Almost Started a War’: US Military Nearly Boarded a Chinese Ship Based on Bad Intel From AI
THE SO WHAT
An AI hallucination nearly triggering a boarding of a Chinese vessel is a live-fire example of why LLMs cannot sit unmediated in command chains. Any operator using AI for threat intel or targeting needs explicit doctrine: where AI can suggest, where humans must verify, and where AI is banned from the loop.
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