
Hundreds of thousands at risk as NordVPN uncovers sophisticated adware campaign hidden in 50,000 pirate sites
THE SO WHAT
An adware campaign across 50,000 pirate sites that bypasses ad blockers is a reminder that “free” traffic sources are now a security surface, not just a legal gray zone. If your users touch these ecosystems—sports, movies, gaming—treat compromised browsers and devices as a default assumption in your threat model.
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